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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Melvin Dewayne Perkins appeals from the summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief. Specifically, Perkins challenges the district 
court's denial of his request for appointment of counsel. 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Perkins pied guilty to injury to child and the district court sentenced him to 
a unified sentence of seven years with the first two years fixed. State v. Perkins, 
Docket No. 38551, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 589 (Idaho App., August 23, 
2011 ). Perkins filed a Rule 35 motion seeking leniency in his sentence. Isl The 
district court denied Perkins' motion. Isl The Court of Appeals affirmed the order 
denying Perkins' Rule 35 motion, finding the district court correctly denied the 
motion based on Perkins' failure to provide any new information supporting his 
request for a reduction of his sentence. Isl 
Perkins filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging he had 
received an illegal sentence, his 4th, 5th and 6th Amendment rights had been 
violated, the state had violated the plea agreement, and his counsel was 
ineffective for failing "to hold the Prosecutors [sic] office accountable for a written 
Plea Agreement" and for failing to file a Rule 35 motion and a direct appeal. (R., 
pp.2-3.) Perkins sought relief in the form of a new sentence or the opportunity to 
withdraw his guilty plea. (R., p.3.) Perkins also filed a motion and affidavit in 
support requesting the appointment of counsel. (R., pp.16-19.) The state filed 
an answer, asserting the petition failed to state any grounds upon which relief 
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could be granted, the claims should have been raised on direct appeal, and the 
petition contained bare and conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by admissible 
evidence. (R., pp.31-36.) The state also sought dismissal of the petition for 
post-conviction relief. (R., p.34.) The district court filed a notice of intent to 
dismiss the petition. (R., pp.37-57.) It first considered and denied Perkins' 
request for counsel in his post-conviction proceeding, finding because Perkins' 
claims were frivolous and he "did not allege facts raising even the possibility of a 
valid claim," Perkins was not entitled to the appointment of counsel. (R., p.41.) 
Perkins filed a response to the notice of intent to dismiss and supported it with 
transcripts, written communication with his attorney, and argument. (R., pp.72-
92.) The district court dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief, finding 
Perkins was not entitled to relief as a matter of law. (R., pp.93-102.) 
Perkins timely appealed. (R., pp.103-108.) 
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ISSUE 
Perkins states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Perkins' motion 
for appointment of post-conviction counsel? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
Has Perkins failed to show error in the district court's denial of post-
conviction counsel? 
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ARGUMENT 
Perkins Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying His Request For The Appointment Of Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Perkins asserts on appeal that the court erred in denying his request for 
post-conviction counsel filed contemporaneously with his prose petition for post-
conviction relief. (Appellant's brief, p.4.) Because Perkins failed to raise any 
potentially valid claims in his petition for post-conviction relief, Perkins' argument 
fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is 
governed by I.C. § 19-4904. The decision to grant or deny a request for court-
appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v. 
State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 
682, 683, 214 P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009). The court's discretion is not 
unfettered, however. If the petitioner qualifies financially and "alleges facts 
showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further investigation on 
the defendant's behalf," the court must appoint post-conviction counsel to assist 
the petitioner in developing his or her claims. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 
654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. 
If, on the other hand, the claims in the petition are so patently frivolous that there 
appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with 
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the assistance of counsel and further investigation, the court may deny the 
request for counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing 
meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 
P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 684, 214 P.3d 668, 670 (Ct. 
App. 2009). 
When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of 
discretion standard as applied to I.C. § 19-4904 "permits the trial court to 
determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of 
counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the 
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be 
expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 793-94, 102 P .3d at 1112-13. In reviewing the denial of a motion for 
appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, "[t]his Court will not set 
aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to 
questions of law, this Court exercises free review." Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 
676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001), quoted in Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 
P. 3d at 1111 . 
C. Perkins Has Failed To Show That He Was Entitled To The Appointment 
Of Post-Conviction Counsel 
Perkins asserts the district court erred in denying his motion for the 
appointment of post-conviction counsel because, he contends, his petition 
"contained sufficient allegations that, at a minimum, raised the possibility of two 
valid claims." (R., p.8.) Specifically, Perkins argues that counsel should have 
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been appointed to represent him in his claims that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel when "counsel failed to object to the State's breach of the 
plea agreement," and when "counsel failed to file a Notice of Appeal." (Id.) The 
district court correctly reviewed Perkins' petition for post-conviction relief "to 
determine whether the facts alleged justify the appointment of counsel" and 
ultimately concluded Perkins' allegations were frivolous and he "did not allege 
facts raising even the possibility of a valid claim." (R., p.41.) 
In his pro se petition for post-conviction relief, Perkins claimed his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing "to hold the Prosecutors [sic] office accountable 
for a written Plea Agreement" where Perkins signed such agreement with the 
belief that he would "only Receive Probation." (R., p.3 (capitalization original).) 
Perkins requested he be granted relief in the form of either an amended 
sentence ("I would like to be granted my withheld judgement [sic] and the 
Probation i [sic] agreed to") or the ability to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., p.3 
(capitalization original).) To support his position, Perkins included an affidavit 
stating he pied guilty to the charge of injury to child because his attorney advised 
him to and because he "was suppose[d] to get probation only and not a day 
served in jail." (R., p.6.) The district court, in denying his motion for post-
conviction counsel, interpreted Perkins' argument to be an assertion that his 
guilty plea was not entered voluntarily. (R., pp.50-53.) The district court looked 
to Perkins' affidavit supporting his petition for post-conviction relief wherein 
Perkins complained: 
I spoke with Mr. Marler on several occasions, During one of 
the visits with Mr. Marler he informed me that the State was going 
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to offer me a plea agreement if i plead guilty. I asked about the 
conditions of the plea bargain and he stated if i plead guilty to injury 
to a child the State would offer me a withheld judgement and 
probation. The only Reason i Plead [sic] guilty to these charges 
that i'm in Prison for that my attorney advised me too. because I 
was suppose to get probation only and not a day served in jail, 
other then that i would have went to trial on all charges. 
(R., p.6 (verbatim).) 
"The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is 
whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the 
alternative courses of action open to the defendant." Lint v, State, 145 Idaho 
472,481, 180 P.3d 511, 520 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 
50, 60, 106 P.3d 376, 386 (2004)). "For a guilty plea to be valid, the entire record 
must demonstrate that the plea was entered into in a voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent manner." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 527, 164 P.3d 798, 807 
(2007) (citing State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 96, 156 P.3d 1193, 1194 (2007)). 
Determining whether a plea is voluntary involves three inquiries: "(1) whether the 
defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the nature of the 
charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and 
intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial; and (3) whether the defendant 
understood the consequences of pleading guilty." !sl (citing State v. Colyer, 98 
Idaho 32, 34, 557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976)). In examining the record, the district 
court concluded Perkins' plea was voluntarily entered: 
The record in this case indicates the Petitioner entered a 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent guilty plea. Mr. Perkins 
submitted a signed and completed Guilty Questionnaire wherein he 
acknowledged that he understood all of the questions on the form 
and that his answers were true and correct. The Petitioner 
indicated he was not under the influence of any kind of alcohol, 
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drugs, or medication. He also indicated that he "had enough time 
to discuss all of the ramifications" of his case with his attorney. He 
acknowledged he had "fully discussed all facts and circumstances 
surround the charges" against him with his attorney. Mr. Perkins 
also admitted his attorney had "discussed fully" the "possible 
consequences" of a guilty plea. Mr. Perkins further indicated that 
he was "satisfied" with his attorney's services and that he felt he 
had "been adequately and competently represented" by his 
attorney. The Petitioner also acknowledged that he "realize[d] he 
"may be imprisoned in the State Penitentiary" for his crime and he 
understood that his sentence "may be imposed with no right to 
probation or parole". Also significant was the Petitioner's 
recognition that no person had threatened him or done anything to 
make him enter his plea against his will. Mr. Perkins further 
indicated he had not been promised any special sentence, reward, 
favorable treatment, or leniency with regard to his plea. The 
Petitioner acknowledged that the "only person who can promise 
what sentence" he would actually receive was the judge. The 
Petitioner also signified he had answered all of the questions 
truthfully and of his own free will. Furthermore, the plea agreement 
signed by Mr. Perkins clearly stated it was "not intended by the 
parties to be binding on the Court." 
(R., pp.52-53 (citations to the record omitted).) The district court conditionally 
denied Perkins' request for counsel after concluding Perkins' claim that his plea 
was not voluntarily made was frivolous, but it gave Perkins the required 20 days 
to support his arguments presented in his petition for post-conviction relief. (See, 
generally. R., pp.37-57 (Notice of Intent to Dismiss).) 
Perkins filed a response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss, 
focusing on his assertion that the plea agreement was breached and including 
written correspondence between Perkins and his trial counsel and transcripts 
from plea and sentencing hearings. (R., pp.58-92.) Although Perkins asserts on 
appeal the district court "never analyzed the claim that his attorney was 
ineffective for failing to object to the breach" (Appellant's brief, p.9), the court did 
address the question of the alleged breach of the plea agreement by the state. 
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In its order dismissing Perkins' petition for post-conviction relief, the district court 
found Perkins failed to present additional evidence that would support his 
assertions that the state breached the plea agreement and that his attorney was 
ineffective for failing to object to such breach. (R,. pp.95-96.) The court found it 
was actually Perkins who breached the plea agreement by failing to appear for 
his original sentencing date almost six years before sentence was finally 
imposed: 
At that time [after Perkins entered his plea] the court set the 
matter for sentencing and confirmed the date with the [sic] Mr. 
Perkins. On November 29, 2004, Mr. Perkins did not appear for his 
sentencing. In fact, his attorney explained that he had tried to 
reach him by phone but was not successful. As a result of Mr. 
Perkins['] failure to appear for sentencing the court issued a bench 
warrant for his arrest. Mr. Perkins breached the plea agreement by 
not appearing for sentencing therefore negating any obligation the 
state had to make any recommendations for sentencing based 
upon the terms of the plea agreement. By the time Mr. Perkins was 
arrested and brought back in front of the court in September of 
2010, the state was no longer required to make any sentencing 
recommendations pursuant to the plea agreement because of the 
Petitioner's breach of that agreement. 
(R., pp.98-99 (record citations omitted).) 
Implicit in a plea agreement is the defendant's appearance at sentencing. 
Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 519, 960 P.2d 738, 740 (1998). A failure to appear 
will constitute a breach of the agreement by the defendant: 
In essence, part of pleading guilty pursuant to a plea 
agreement, is receiving the benefits of the agreement at sentencing 
for the crime to which the defendant has admitted guilt. Generally a 
defendant cannot receive a sentence unless he attends the 
sentencing hearing and consequently, failing to attend sentencing 
constitutes a breach of the plea agreement by the defendant. 
State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 74, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005). The district court 
correctly found Perkins himself had violated the plea agreement and was not 
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"entitled to any relief as a matter of law." (R., p.101.) Because the additional 
information Perkins provided the district court in support of his claim that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the state's breach of the plea 
agreement actually showed Perkins' own breach, the record supports the court's 
original finding that this claim was frivolous and the court did not err in denying 
Perkins' request for post-conviction counsel. 
Perkins also contends on appeal that his motion for post-conviction 
counsel was improperly denied because his pro se petition raised a viable claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a Rule 35 motion or a direct 
appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-13.) In his petition, Perkins made a blanket, 
unsupported statement that his attorney "failed to file [his] Rule 35 and [his] 
Direct Appeal." (R., p.3.) This claim is not addressed in any of the materials 
accompanying Perkins' petition. In finding this claim frivolous and denying 
Perkins' request for counsel, the district court found: 
The Petitioner alleged that his attorney was ineffective 
because he "failed to file my Rule 35 and my Direct Appeal." 
However, other than this bare statement, Mr. Perkins does not offer 
any other argument or statement in support. Mr. Perkins does not 
allege or present evidence that he actually requested his attorney 
file an appeal or that his attorney failed to comply with such 
request. Mr. Perkins did not even address this allegation in his 
supporting affidavit. Furthermore, Mr. Perkins did file a motion for 
reduction of his sentence under Rule 35, which motion was denied 
by the district court and the appellate court. Therefore, as the 
Petitioner has not presented any evidence, or even asserted, that 
he communicated his desire to appeal to his counsel or that his 
counsel understood he had made such a request, the Petitioner 
has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
(R., pp.54-55 (record citation omitted).) In his response to the district court's 
notice of intent to dismiss, Perkins once again failed to even address this claim. 
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On appeal, Perkins appears to argue that by merely alleging his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a Rule 35 motion or an appeal, Perkins is entitled to 
an inference that "he either instructed his attorney to file a Notice of Appeal or 
that his attorney was ineffective in failing to consult with him regarding whether to 
file a Notice of Appeal." (Appellant's brief, pp.12-13.) However, Perkins provides 
no support for this position except citing to ABA Guidelines advising that a 
defense attorney has obligations to advise defendants of appellate rights. 
(Appellant's brief, p.13, n.4.) It does not logically follow from Perkins' bare 
statement "my Attorney failed to file my Rule 35 and my Direct Appeal" that 
Perkins necessarily asked his attorney to file on his behalf or that his attorney 
failed to consult with him. The district court did not err in finding Perkins' claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a Rule 35 motion or an 
appeal invalid and not entitling Perkins to the appointment of counsel. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court uphold the district court's denial 
of Perkins' request for post-conviction counsel. 
DATED this 1ih day of February 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1ih day of February 2013, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
SPENCERJ.HAHN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Def 
Supreme Court Clerk's offi e. 
NLS/pm 
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